We propose a novel institution to enhance MPA design –a ‘Conservation Finance Area (CFA)’ –that utilizes leased fishing zones inside of MPAs, fed by spillover, to finance monitoring and enforcement and achieve greater conservation success. We show that CFAs can fully finance enforcement, deter illegal fishing, and ultimately maximize fish biomass
KD Millage, JC Villaseñor-Derbez, D Bradley, MG Burguess, HS Lenihan, C Costello
Coastal marine ecosystems face a host of pressures from both offshore and land-based human activity. We use a new high-resolution geospatial model to measure and map nitrogen (N) and pathogen—fecal indicator organisms (FIO)—inputs from human sewage for ~135,000 watersheds globally. Our model indicates that wastewater adds 6.2Tg nitrogen into coastal waters, which is approximately 40% of total nitrogen from agriculture.
C Tuholske, B Halpern, G Blasco, JC Villaseñor-Derbez, M Frazier, K Caylor
We present a case study of asymetries in management using the giant sea bass (Stereolepis gigas, Polyprionidae) to highlight how these management and research asymmetries can skew national perceptions of population status for a fully transboundary species. We find large asymetries in the number of scientific publications and annual funding related to giant sea bass; annual fishery production and consumptive value; and visual records. These asymmetries have generated a distorted view of the population status of the giant sea bass across its entire range.
A Ramírez-Valdez, TJ Rowell, KE Dale, MT Craig, LG Allen, JC Villaseñor-Derbez, AM Cisneros-Montemayor, A Hernández-Velaso, J Torre, J Hofmeister, BE Erisman
The use of moored fish aggregating devices (MFADs) has greatly expanded in the Caribbean region in recent decades. States vary widely in the size, ownership institutions, and management of their MFAD fisheries. Lack of management may degrade potential MFAD benefits and increase risk of negative social and ecological outcomes.
MW Wilson, JM Lawson, MI Rivera-Hechem, JC Villaseñor-Derbez, SD Gaines
We simulate and test an international fisheries management scheme with transferable fishing rights that incentivizes, rather than hinders, large-scale marine conservation. We show that transferable fishing rights and a biomass-based allocation rule are pivotal to incentivize conservation under this market-based setting. Our work focuses on the Vessel Day Scheme (VDS)—an environmental market that is employed by the Parties to the Nauru Agreement (a group of nine Pacific Island nations) to manage their tuna fisheries—and areas in which large-scale conservation interventions have taken place.
JC Villaseñor-Derbez, J Lynham, C Costello
